For submission to the Parliamentary Home Affairs Committee by ACHES (Adult Child Health and Environmental Support)

We wonder what are the actual implications for a digital ID in relation to controlling crime, since we know from the current huge number of illegal immigrants entering the UK, that many tend to destroy any form of ID for example. Criminals too, often use weapons to threaten and to achieve their aims. It is hard to imagine that digital ID is likely in any way to control or deter such criminal activity when they can shoot their way through or intimidate with other violent means. ACHES cannot see that there is any conceivable way that a digital ID will counteract the current waves of illegal immigration and which it appears is so upsetting the British public, setting it against the government, currently.

Lord Sumption, former supreme court judge, highlighted that France and Germany both operate ID systems and both countries suffer mass illegal immigration according to news reports.

GDPR was set up to protect individuals' privacy so it is hard to imagine that a digital ID, which could of course be hacked, will be in accordance with the objectives of GDPR. IT experts have indicated that to have so much information all located within a Digital ID would be a "hackers` paradise" in terms of identity theft – so leading to an increase in the already high levels of digital fraud. This would be particularly worrying in relation to the banking sector.

Recent data breaches and/or hacking attacks such as Crowdstrike in 2024 and M&S this year with possibly others not mentioned, have clearly illustrated that it is a real danger and not exaggeration. As the IoT expands its tentacles there will likely be many more poorly protected entries into the hitherto apparently more secure ones.

The vaccine passport project was totally unsuccessful in regards of take up, so why does the government feel that this digital ID project will not be equally unsuccessful in terms of take up? Such an exercise therefore could be a huge waste of public money at a time when the nation could ill afford such.

The recent Afghan data breach is an illustration of the state`s astonishingly poor record on data protection. Why should the public be confident that a much larger scale data breach would not occur in a governmental digital ID project? Other examples of the data breaches on behalf of the British state are:

- The Royal Free NHS Foundation Trust and Google DeepMind AI scandal
- MI5: In June 2019 MI5 was found to have been unlawfully retaining innocent people's data for years. (very shocking)
- The massive data breach following a hack of Legal Aid Agency

Britain has always rejected a "Papers Please" mentality, a mentality which has been prevalent for example in mainland Europe. Why would any UK government, post Brexit, wish to overturn this long

held British approach and which is very much part of Britain's cherished democratic tradition? A tradition of the vein of freedom that lies very deep in the British psyche.

China is reputed to have implemented a digital social scoring system based on surveillance of individuals in Chinese society, through the 5G wireless area network. 5G is defined in this sense as a scanning and backhaul of data, technology – where the data is picked up by scanning beams and fed back to an analytical AI computer. This is mass surveillance and is actually far worse than the traditional "papers please" mentality as demonstrated in mainland Europe. The Chinese system enables not only geolocation but geofencing in which aspects of human activity are digitally shut off, out of reach, of "offending" individuals. "Offending individuals" being those as so defined by a "big brother state". That is not society in any way aligned to the concept of a democratic society we in Britain would recognise or condone. Such a surveillance network is an attribute of a totalitarian state, of course.

Indeed, the whole proposed UK Digital ID project should be subject to the 4 Gunning Principles. Those principles being:

1. Consultation at a formative stage

2. Provision of sufficient reasoning disclosing reasons with claimed advantages and foreseen problems; which would need to be written by an unbiased observer.

3. Adequate time allowed for consideration and response

4. That the results of the consultation must be taken into account. Given "conscientious consideration" as Sedley QC phrased it.

Since this proposed UK digital ID project would affect the total population of the UK, the consultation should be sent to all of the population, nationally, and not be restricted to a very small percentage of the population responding on-line to a Home Affairs parliamentary select committee enquiry – otherwise it would not comply with the ethos of the Gunning Principles. Responses also should be accepted by off-line methods, even letters on paper.

Such a consultation would of course have to be governed by the Nolan Principles of public life and which are: Selflessness, Integrity, Objectivity, Accountability, Openness, Honesty and Leadership.

Returning to the Chinese surveillance model – which is totally "un-British", in London, Transport for London (TfL) and the Greater London Authority have installed mesoscopic scanning equipment in their traffic monitoring apparatus, as detailed in the YUNEX literature. Yunex being the manufacturer of the relevant surveillance equipment. This mesocsopic activity is as set out in the Yunex literature, in which literature also is described the "Living Laboratory" – a collaboration between Yunex Traffic and TfL. The term mesoscopic refers to nano scale or molecular level surveillance which presumably means biometric data is being surveilled and backhauled.

If a digital ID were to be implemented, it is presumed that biometric data would be included in such a digital record.

The Yunex 5G network installed in London with its mesoscopic surveillance capacity appears to backhaul through a Chinese made Cinterion modem contained within the Yunex equipment.

An internet search under the term "Cinterion" coincidentally reveals the following:

"Cinterion SGL81 Smart Gateway | Thales Group
The smart gateway adds support for USB, embedded processing via the Cinterion SDK ThreadX and future GNSS support. Fastest way to connect assets The 20-pin GPIO connector (GPIOs, SPI, I2C, PWM) and higher bandwidth enables a wider range of applications including video surveillance"

Is this why the former head of Britain`s Mi6, Sir Richard Dearlove, has stated publicly that the Chinese have too much control over London`s traffic ?

For all the points elucidated above, notions of a UK digital ID project should be abandoned and permanently and also the Yunex equipment accordingly legally dismantled.